Will the Real
Emotional Intelligence Please Stand Up?
On Deconstructing the
Emotional Intelligence "Debate",
by Catherine S. Daus,
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
and Neal M. Ashkanasy, The University of Queensland
From http://siop.org/tip/Oct03/16daus.htm
My summary of the article - S. Hein
Basically the authors say Daniel Goleman and Reuven Bar-On have misled the public and the academic community, and they criticize the academic community for being so easily deceived. In their rejection of the Goleman and Bar-On models of EI, the authors echo the views of this website and a growing number of academic researchers. In their own words, the authors say,
"Let us first begin by making one point crystal clear-we do not endorse a Goleman (1995) or Bar-On (1997) type of approach to studying emotional intelligence...we also feel that to an extent, they have done much more harm than good regarding establishing emotional intelligence as a legitimate, empirical construct "
The authors have better things to say about the Mayer, Salovey and Caruso model of EI, and their test of it. They call it the "gold standard" of what is available so far. They say the new edition of their test, the MSCEIT, is a better test of EI than the earlier versions created by Mayer et al. They also say that the field of studying and measuring emotional intelligence is still very young and it is understandable that there would be some concerns about even the Mayer et al model, which they believe is the most well conceived model of EI at this point.
Selected Quotes from the Article
"...some academics in our field have a rather limited exposure and a very narrow-minded, unsubstantiated view of the construct."
"It is unusual, and sometimes disturbing, to see scientists and researchers uncritically cite a popular trade book alongside peer-reviewed articles."
"...psychologists should view emotional intelligence as based in ability and behavior, rather than in self-reports of attitudes, preferences, and/or values."
"Let us first begin by making one point crystal clear-we do not endorse a Goleman (1995) or Bar-On (1997) type of approach to studying emotional intelligence...we also feel that to an extent, they have done much more harm than good regarding establishing emotional intelligence as a legitimate, empirical construct "
"... ability approaches to emotional intelligence conceive of the construct as the ability to solve emotional problems; it is developed in childhood and can be strengthened over time."
"According to Mayer et al. (2003), .'Emotional intelligence involves problem solving with and about emotions'"
"...any researcher serious about studying emotional intelligence must consider an ability approach, which is focused on emotional problem solving; we feel Mayer, Salovey and Caruso’s approach sets the gold standard for this."
Neal Ashkanasy and I (Catherine Daus) had the distinct
"pleasure" of debating Ed Locke and Frank Landy on the
construct of emotional intelligence at this past SIOP Annual
Conference in Orlando. I, unintelligently (emotionally or
otherwise!), agreed to substitute for Peter Salovey who had
professional commitments that precluded him from attending. Apart
from the discomfort of being in Frank Landy’s direct line of
fire (to which anyone who has had the privilege could certainly
attest) and the sheer intimidation factor of standing and
speaking to an audience of standing-room-only capacity (Neal
calculated about 350+ people), I feel the experience was
enlightening and valuable to me, as I learned what concerns
academics in our field have with the construct of emotional
intelligence. However, it was also quite frustrating as I feel
that some academics in our field have a rather limited exposure
and a very narrow-minded, unsubstantiated view of the construct.
The primary arguments proffered by Landy and Locke can be
captured in three broad points:
1. Emotional intelligence is little more than a loose
conglomeration of extant personality traits.
2. Emotional intelligence does not meet psychometric standards.
3. Emotional intelligence has no clear measurement rubric-it
changes all the time.
Our responses to these three points are integrally linked,
particularly when we connect them to our starting point, which is
an ability model of emotional intelligence, exemplified by the
research of Mayer and colleagues (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey,
1999; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso,
& Sitaraneos, 2001, 2003). Thus, our key point is:
I-O psychologists should view emotional intelligence as based in
ability and behavior, rather than in self-reports of attitudes,
preferences, and/or values.
Let us first begin by making one point crystal clear-we do not
endorse a Goleman (1995) or Bar-On (1997) type of approach to
studying emotional intelligence in the workplace. These models
may indeed be useful for organizational development and
interventions, but they are much too broad in scope, and do not
appear to markedly differ from traditional personality models or
competency models. In addition, these two approaches have
generated assessment devices that are based upon self-report,
yielding self- and other-perceptions of these traits rather than
an estimate of a person’s actual emotional ability.
In fact, we did not disagree with Locke and Landy’s points
regarding the questionable nature of these models, and we also
feel that to an extent, they have done much more harm than good
regarding establishing emotional intelligence as a legitimate,
empirical construct with incremental validity potential. It is
unusual, and sometimes disturbing, to see scientists and
researchers uncritically cite a popular trade book alongside
peer-reviewed articles.
Rather, we suggest that the only approach that makes sense is one
that meets these criteria: (a) uses a skill-based or behavioral,
preferably nonself-report method of measurement; (b) focuses
narrowly and specifically on emotional skills and abilities only;
(c) has demonstrated construct distinctiveness; and (d) has
demonstrably good psychometric properties.
The Mayer et al. approach meets these criteria.
We begin with a definition of emotional intelligence. Our
definition of emotional intelligence is Mayer et al.’s
(1999) definition:
Emotional intelligence refers to an ability to recognize the
meanings of emotions and their relationships, and to reason and
problem-solve on the basis of them. Emotional intelligence is
involved in the capacity to perceive emotions, assimilate
emotion-related feelings, understand the information of those
emotions, and manage them (p. 267).
Thus, ability approaches to emotional intelligence conceive of
the construct as the ability to solve emotional problems; it is
developed in childhood and can be strengthened over time.
According to Mayer et al. (2003), "Emotional intelligence
involves problem solving with and about emotions" (p. 1).
Such measures require performance tests to assess the construct.
For example, in their most recent measure, the
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; 2002),
the subscales and tests require the participant to view a series
of faces and report how much of each of six emotions is present,
answer questions about emotional scenarios and responses (e.g.,
judge how much joy one might experience while planning a party),
and solve emotional problems (e.g., decide what response is
appropriate when a friend calls you upset over losing her job).
Many other measures, particularly the more popular, commercial
ones such as the BarOn Eq-i (1997) and Goleman and
colleagues’ measure, the Emotional Competence Inventory
(Boyatzis, Goleman, & Rhee, 2000) sample a broad range of
individual differences and as such, tend to show quite
substantial overlap with the Big Five (see, for example, Davies,
Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; Dawda & Hart, 2000). The danger
of this, of course, is that we are simply seeing "old wine
in new wineskins" and calling something by a fancy, sexy new
name, emotional intelligence, when it is simply measuring some
other well-established personality trait. We believe that this
was at the heart of Locke’s argument (and a large part of
Landy’s) and suspect that they might agree with the
following statement by noted emotion researcher, Joseph
Ciarrochi, and colleagues (Ciarrochi, Chan, Caputi, &
Roberts, 2001): "Generally, we should not make up a test and
call it EI when really it is a measure of some other,
well-established personality trait" (p. 28). We also
couldn’t agree more! The Mayer, Salovey, Caruso model has
shown little to no overlap with the Big Five personality
constructs (Mayer et al., 1999; Mayer et al., 2001) and small to
medium overlap with other, well known personality constructs such
as positive and negative affectivity (Ciarrochi, Chan, &
Caputi, 2000; Ciarrochi et al., 2001). We concur with Ciarrochi
and colleagues’ (2001) assessment: "Perhaps one of the
greatest strengths underlying the MEIS is its
distinctiveness" ( p. 31).
The original measure of Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso, the
Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS) was the first
comprehensive ability measure of emotional intelligence.
Psychometric evidence for this measure, its reliability,
convergent and discriminant validity were all reasonable. In the
debate, the point was raised by Landy that some of the subscales
of the MEIS had low reliabilities. This is indeed the case. While
we feel it is a moot point to clarify since the newer MSCEIT does
not suffer from this problem, we do wish to inform the reader,
lest he or she be suspicious that we are ignoring important
contradictory evidence. Depending on the type of scoring chosen,
the internal consistency reliabilities for the 12 subscales
(tapping four branches of Perceiving, Facilitating,
Understanding, and Managing emotions) ranged from .49 to .94
(consensus scoring), and .35 to .86 (expert scoring; Mayer et
al., 1999). Total branch reliabilities were all higher,
reasonable, and their use recommended by the authors. We feel it
critical to emphasize that one or two subscales with less than
desirable reliabilities, for a measure in its theoretical,
psychometric, and empirical infancy, is not only quite
reasonable, but also to be expected as a natural step in
construct specification and measurement development. In fact,
their revised measure, the MSCEIT, addressed and rectified most
of the low reliabilities-branch score reliabilities for this
measure ranged from .76-91. Further, a confirmatory factor
analysis provided convincing support for their proposed
four-branch factor structure (Mayer et al., 2003). Advances in
scoring have also been made with the MSCEIT, addressing earlier
concerns with the first-generation test. It is certainly far from
a perfect measure, but seemingly robust enough for serious use.
In the debate, Landy quipped that, much like the weather, if you
don’t like how emotional intelligence is measured,
"stick around…it’ll change." The implication,
of course, is that this measure can’t be trusted; that
researchers in the area of emotional intelligence don’t know
what they want to measure or how to measure it. To counter,
first, as we directly said in the debate, and as we reiterate
here, any researcher serious about studying emotional
intelligence must consider an ability approach, which is focused
on emotional problem solving; we feel Mayer, Salovey and
Caruso’s approach sets the gold standard for this. Second,
of course measures change! This is the hallmark of empirical
inquiry and measurement development…the essence of the
hypothetico-deductive model. Indeed, we feel it quite remarkable
that for a construct that is roughly only a decade or two old,
there has been as much work on measurement development and
refinement as exists. I’m not sure that we were this far
along a mere 10 years after Galton measured the craniums of
visitors to a fair or Binet asked school children a few simple
questions.
References
Bar-On, R. (1997). The Emotional Intelligence Inventory (EQ-I):
Technical manual. Toronto, Canada: Multi-Health Systems, Inc.
Boyatzis, R. E., Goleman, D., & Rhee, K. S. (2000).
Clustering competence in emotional intelligence: Insights from
the Emotional Competence Inventory. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A.
Parker (Eds.), The handbook of Emotional Intelligence: Theory,
development, assessment, and application at home, school, and in
the workplace. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Ciarrochi, J., Chan, A., & Caputi, P. (2000). A critical
evaluation of the emotional intelligence construct. Personality
and Individual Differences, 28, 539-561.
Ciarrochi, J., Chan, A., Caputi, P., & Roberts, R. (2001).
Measuring emotional intelligence. In
Ciarrochi, Forgas, & Mayer (Eds.), Emotional Intelligence in
everyday life: A scientific inquiry. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology
Press.
Davies, M., Stankov, L., & Roberts, R. D. (1998). Emotional
intelligence: In search of an elusive construct. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 989-1015.
Dawda, D. & Hart, S. D. (2000). Assessing emotional
intelligence: Reliability and validity of the BarOn Emotional
Quotient Inventory (EQ-I) in university students. Personality and
Individual Differences, 28, 797-812.
Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional intelligence. New York: Bantam
Books.
Mayer, J. D., Caruso, D. R., & Salovey, P. (1999) Emotional
intelligence meets traditional standards for an intelligence.
Intelligence, 27, 267-298.
Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. R. (2002).
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT)
User’s Manual. Toronto, Canada: MHS Publishers.
Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., Caruso, D. R., & Sitaraneos, G.
(2001). Emotional intelligence as a standard intelligence.
Emotion, 1, 232-242.
Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., Caruso, D. R., & Sitaraneos, G.
(2003). Measuring emotional intelligence with the MSCEIT V2.0.
Emotion, 3, 97-105.